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IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant/plaintiff appeals from the Third Judicial District 
Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of 
appellees/defendants Bunzl Utah, Inc. and Carl A. Kruse. 
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3) (1953, as amended). 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. If an employee checklist (which new employees sign) and 
an employee handbook clearly and unambiguously state that 
employment is "at-will," does a vague, non-specific, pre-
employment oral statement that employees will be "given a chance 
to correct work deficiencies" before termination create an 
implied-in-fact agreement that an employee's status will be other 
than at-will? 
2. Do limited instances of written or oral warnings to 
other employees modify the at-will relationship expressed in the 
company's written policies creating an implied-in-fact agreement 
that an employee must receive warnings and be given a chance to 
correct deficiencies before being terminated? 
3. Is evidence of either an oral statement or an 
employer's course of conduct sufficient to create a question of 
fact as to whether an implied-in-fact agreement exists when both 
an employee checklist and an employee handbook expressly state 
that employment is at-will? 
4. Even if the employer in this case did have an implied-
in-fact agreement not to dismiss an employee without giving the 
employee an opportunity to correct her deficiencies, did the 
employer fulfill that obligation under the undisputed facts of 
this case? 
5. Does this case justify a ruling that is directly 
contrary to recent precedent and established Utah case law 
regarding: 
(a) Utah's refusal to recognize a cause of action for 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
an at-will employment relationship; 
(b) Utah's requirements that a defamation claim include 
allegations and proof of special damages or statements that are 
slanderous per se, and publication to third-parties; and 
(c) Utah's refusal to recognize a common law claim for 
retaliatory discharge? 
The issues in this case were summarily decided in 
defendants' favor• Summary judgment is appropriate when the 
facts as established in the pleadings and affidavits, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, present "no 
genuine issue[s] as to any material fact and . . . the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). This determination is a question of law. Under the 
appropriate standard of review, this court should'afford the 
trial court's conclusions of law no deference, and should review 
them de novo "for correctness." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 
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155 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1991); see also Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
VI. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Defendants submit that Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., 771 
P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) and Brehanv v. Nordstrom, Inc., 161 Utah 
Adv. Rep 7 (Utah 1991) are controlling in this case and affirm 
that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and-Course of Proceedings Below 
This appeal is taken from the Third Judicial District 
Court's order of summary judgment for defendants on December 19, 
1990. Plaintiff commenced this action against defendants in 
December 1988, alleging six causes of action for wrongful 
termination and defamation. R. 2-9. The wrongful termination 
claims were based on purported breaches of both an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and an implied-in-fact 
agreement altering the company's at-will employment policy. 
Defendants moved for summary judgment. After oral arguments, the 
Third District Court granted and entered judgment on December 19, 
1990, based upon defendants' memoranda. R. 482-483. Plaintiff 
filed a Notice of Appeal on January 17, 1991. R. 484. 
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B. Statement of Facts 
Defendant, Bunzl Utah, Inc. ("Bunzl") hired plaintiff as a 
bookkeeper on January 27, 1986. R. 2. Prior to her employment, 
she was interviewed by Terry Frank of Bunzl. R. 300-301. During 
the interview, Mr. Frank explained to her that Bunzl was "an at-
will company and that [plaintiff had] the right to leave at any 
time, and . . . [Bunzl had] the right to dismiss [plaintiff] at 
any time." R. 303-304. Plaintiff then inquired, "Surely you 
would not dismiss an employee without giving them a chance to 
correct deficiencies for job performance?" Plaintiff alleges 
that Mr. Frank responded, "Oh, no. We would never do anything 
like that. We have procedures that we follow for disciplinary 
action. . . ." R. 304.1 
On her first day of employment with Bunzl, approximately 
January 31, 1986, plaintiff signed a New Employee Checklist. 
Immediately above her signature, the Checklist stated: 
I understand the above are general management 
guidelines and may be changed as business necessity 
requires. The above does not constitute a written 
contract and I understand mv employment is for no 
definite period and may be terminated at will. 
I acknowledge that we have discussed all the above. 
R. 364 (emphasis added). 
1
 Respondents deny that Mr. Frank made any such statement. 
For purposes of this appeal, however, respondents.assume that Mr. 
Frank made this statement, in order to present the facts in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
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Plaintiff admits that she was hired for an indefinite 
period. R. 366, She also admits that she understood she would 
be an "at-will" employee and that she never had a written 
employment contract with Bunzl. R. 302, 308, 366. Plaintiff 
understood that she could leave Bunzl at any time for any or no 
reason. R. 309. 
At the time of her hire, plaintiff understood that Bunzl was 
preparing an Employee Handbook which would outline the company's 
disciplinary and termination procedures. R. 306-307. In April 
1987, plaintiff received a copy of the Handbook and read it. 
R. 309. The front page of the Employee Handbook provides as 
follows: 
The plans, policies, rules and procedures described in 
this Handbook are not conditions of employment. Bunzl 
reserves the right to modify, revoke, suspend, 
terminate, or change any or all such plans, policies, 
rules or procedures, in whole or in part, at any time 
with or without prior notice. The plans, policies, 
rules and procedures described in this Handbook 
supersede the terms and conditions of any previous 
plans, policies, rules and procedures. 
This Handbook is not intended to create, nor shall it 
be construed to create, a contract between Bunzl and 
any employee, nor shall any of the provisions of the 
plans, policies, rules or procedures described in this 
Handbook create an employment of any fixed or 
indefinite duration. 
Any action of any Bunzl officer, manager, supervisor or 
representative in applying the terms of this Handbook, 
which may leave the appearance of establishing an 
employment contract of fixed or indefinite duration, is 
expressly without authorization and may not be relied 
upon by any Bunzl employee. 
See R. 370 (emphasis added). 
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The Handbook also expressly provides that employment with 
Bunzl is at-will: 
Except for employees who are parties to express written 
Bunzl employment contracts or agreements providing to 
the contrary, employment with Bunzl is employment at 
will and as such, the employee may terminate his/her 
employment at any time and for any reason, Bunzl may 
terminate the employment of a Bunzl employee under the 
same terms. Nevertheless, in order to allow for the 
orderly change of assignments, the Company expects an 
employee to provide to Bunzl notice of separation at 
least fourteen (14) calendar days prior to the date of 
separation. In turn, except in cases of misconduct 
warranting immediate termination, Bunzl, before 
effecting separation of a full time employee with more 
than twelve (12) months service, will provide in its 
discretion either notice of separation fourteen (14) 
calendar days prior to the date of separation or 
provide, without notice, separation pay equivalent to 
not less than the regular straight time base pay the 
employee would have otherwise earned during such 
fourteen (14) calendar day period. 
See R. 372 (emphasis added). 
Finally, the Handbook indicates that no plan of progressive 
discipline or any disciplinary procedures other than at-will are 
in place: 
The Rules that follow are not set down in a sequence of 
gravity or importance. No employee may rely that a 
program of progressive discipline is in effect, but 
rather that each employee must recognize that unless 
he/she has an express written Bunzl employment contract 
or agreement to the contrary, employment at Bunzl is 
at-will employment and just as employees may without 
cause separate from Bunzl upon appropriate fourteen 
calendar day notice, so, also, Bunzl may separate 
employees without cause with appropriate fourteen 
calendar day notice (except that fourteen calendar day 
Bunzl notice may be dispensed with for conduct 
warranting immediate termination). As a conseguence, 
separation may be effected with or without cause as 
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well as for any single Rule violation, without regard for 
any other consideration. 
See R. 384 (emphasis added). 
As part of her responsibilities, plaintiff was required to 
prepare month-end closing reports for the Salt Lake City office. 
She would then send these reports to Bunzl's regional controller, 
Debra Scott, in the home office in St. Louis, Missouri. The 
deadline for these reports was approximately five days after the 
end of each month. R. 310-312, 361-362. By November of 1987, 
plaintiff was routinely requesting extensions of this deadline. 
Plaintiff was late in submitting her closing reports in January, 
February, March, and April of 1988. R. 313-314. 
Debra Scott visited the Salt Lake Office in November 1987 
and reviewed the officefs accounting procedures and plaintifffs 
bookkeeping procedures. She spent time with plaintiff, assisting 
her in overcoming her delays in submitting the closings and 
streamlining office procedures. R. 313, 317-318, 362. 
The tardiness of the month-end reports created problems for 
Debra Scott in Bunzl's corporate office, and plaintiff was aware 
of that. In fact, when plaintiff was working on the January 1988 
closing, Ms. Scott told her, "I have to have your closing. I 
have to correlate my figures and give them to corporate by the 
15th of the month. I have to have those closings." R. 314-315. 
Plaintiff became very concerned about the lateness of the 
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reports, and indicated that she nfelt very bad" about the 
problem. R. 316. 
Debra Scott again visited the Salt Lake City office in 
February or March of 1988. Upon her arrival, Ms. Scott asked 
plaintiff when the closing would be finished. Plaintiff said it 
would take "at least two days." Ms. Scott responded, "Well, then 
I'll help you, because we don't have two days." Ms. Scott then 
did some of the postings to help close the books. Plaintiff 
realized at that time that her lateness was a major concern to 
Ms. Scott and the company. R. 321-324. 
Another Bunzl corporate employee, Trina Travis, visited the 
Salt Lake City office in April 1988 and assisted plaintiff in 
finalizing the closing reports for March. R. 323-324. Bunzl 
also hired temporary employees in February and March of 1988 to 
assist plaintiff in filing the reports. R. 324-326, 341-345, 
346-358. 
Plaintiff was late in finalizing the April 1988 closing 
report. In fact, she was still working on it on May 20, 1988 
when Debra Scott returned to the Salt Lake City office. R. 321-
322, 329-330. Plaintiff was terminated on that day, at which 
time defendant Carl Kruse, the Salt Lake City office manager, 
gave her a termination letter and explained that her termination 
was principally due to her consistent lateness in submitting the 
closings. R. 327-328. At the time of her termination, plaintiff 
-8-
received two weeks' severance pay pursuant to the terms of the 
Employee Handbook. R. 340. 
With respect to her defamation claim, plaintiff admits that 
the only allegedly defamatory statement of which she complains is 
her termination letter, in which defendant Carl Kiruse stated that 
her job performance was "unacceptable." R. 338, 388. Plaintiff 
has no personal knowledge or direct evidence that anyone at Bunzl 
made any defamatory statements about her to other Bunzl 
employees. Plaintiff, herself, heard no defamatory statements 
and is aware of none. R. 335-339. (,fQ. [A]re you aware of any 
specific defamatory statement that was made? A. No.") 
Similarly, plaintiff has no personal knowledge and is unaware of 
any defamatory statements about her made by Carl Kruse or anyone 
else at Bunzl to any person outside of Bunzl. R. 339. ("Q. Do 
you have personal knowledge that statements were made to any 
people outside of Bunzl? A. No. I just can't remember ever 
having heard of anything said to anyone outside of Bunzl.") 
Plaintiff cites four instances of warnings or probationary 
time periods issued to other Bunzl employees. Glen Rigby 
received a memorandum outlining certain employment objectives and 
giving him sixty days to make improvements in his job 
performance. He was later demoted. R. 451-452. Ron Romero was 
given written warning of his deficiencies and a 90-day 
probationary period. He was later terminated. R. 449. Rodney 
Austin was given two oral warnings to stop "playing salesman." 
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R. 454, Kathy Fletcher received a written notice of performance 
deficiencies and was told that unless she improved, she would be 
terminated. R. 458. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. Summary judgment was appropriate in this case because: 
1. Both the signed Employee Checklist and Bunzl's 
subsequent Employee Handbook clearly and unambiguously state that 
employment was at-will. Therefore: 
a. Bunzl had the right to terminate plaintiff's 
employment at any time, with or without cause; 
b. The vague, oral statement by Mr. Frank did not 
create an implied-in-fact agreement altering plaintiff's at-will 
status; 
c. Instances of progressive discipline did not abrogate 
the at-will policy nor create an implied-in-fact agreement; and 
d. Evidence of either the inconsistent oral statement 
or Bunzl's course of conduct in the face of clear written 
promulgations is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
2. Even if an implied-in-fact agreement was created that 
plaintiff would receive an opportunity to correct her 
deficiencies before termination, plaintiff had that opportunity. 
Plaintiff was aware of the problem and given seven months to 
correct it before her termination. 
B. Plaintiff's remaining claims fail because: 
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1. Pursuant to several cases, including this court's 
recent decision in Brehanv v. Nordstrom, Inc., 161 Utah Adv. Rep, 
7 (Utah 1991), Utah does not recognize an implied-in-law covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing exception to the at-will rule. 
2. Plaintiff does not and cannot state a claim for 
defamation; and 
3. Utah does not recognize a common law claim for 
retaliatory discharge. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS. 
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issues of 
material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In the instant case, 
no such issues of fact exist. Neither the alleged oral statement 
by Terry Frank nor Bunzl's course of conduct with other employees 
created an implied-in-fact agreement that plaintiff's employment 
status would be anything but strictly at-will. Since Bunzl's at-
will policy was not merely a presumption, but rather was 
expressly outlined in both the Employee Checklist and the 
Employee Handbook, any evidence of an implied-in-fact agreement 
that would limit that unfettered right is insufficient to create 
a question of fact, and defendants are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
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A. The Ambiguous Pre-Emplovment Oral Statement did not 
Create an Implied-in-Fact Agreement Modifying 
Plaintiff's At-Will Status Because Bunzl's Written 
Policies Clearly State that Employment was At-Will. 
1. Under Utah Case Law, Bunzl's written Employee 
Checklist and Employee Handbook establish that 
plaintiff was an at-will employee. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in recent decisions, has held that 
if an employee is hired for an indefinite term without a written 
employment contract, a presumption is created that employment is 
at-will. Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon, & Davis, Inc., 777 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1989). This presumption may be rebutted by evidence of a 
contrary intent based on language in an employment manual or 
bulletin. See Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 
1044 (Utah 1989); Brehanv v. Nordstrom, Inc., 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 
7 (Utah 1991). However, in the instant case, that presumption is 
affirmed, rather than rebutted, by the language in the company's 
written policies. Plaintiff claims that the alleged oral 
statement by Terry Frank rebutted the at-will doctrine. However, 
the aforementioned cases indicate that the written policies 
control in this case and establish that plaintiff was an at-will 
employee. 
If the language of the Employee Handbook has the power to 
abrogate the at-will doctrine, then under Berube and Nordstrom, 
it certainly has the power to reinforce it. In Nordstrom, 
Justice Stewart states that evidence of "pertinent oral 
-12-
representations" and "employer's course of conduct" may be 
relevant to determine the intent of the parties. 161 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 11. However, such evidence only becomes relevant "[i]f 
the terms of the manual do purport to limit [the company's] power 
to discharge." Id. 
The obvious corollary to Justice Stewart's statement is if 
the Handbook expresses the at-will policy in clear language, then 
evidence of inconsistent oral statements or course of conduct is 
irrelevant and insufficient to create a question of fact as to 
the parties' intent. In fact, Justice Stewart states "that when 
it is plain that a manual or bulletin does not limit the right to 
discharge at will, the case need not go to a jury." Id. at 11 
(quoting Caldwell, 777 P.2d at 486). Triable factual issues 
therefore only exist if the terms of an employment manual attempt 
to limit the right to terminate at-will. Since the Bunzl 
Handbook reaffirms the at-will policy, the evidence of the 
alleged contradictory oral statement is irrelevant. The 
company's at-will policy, expressed unambiguously in writing, 
obviates the issue, and an inconsistent oral statement can not 
create an implied-in-fact agreement to the contrary. 
Plaintiff suggests that because the Employee Handbook did 
not exist at the time of her hire, its stated at-will policy did 
not apply to her. However, plaintiff was aware of Bunzl's at-
will policy long before the Handbook was issued. Plaintiff 
admits that during her pre-employment interview with Mr. Frank he 
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explained to her that her employment was at-will and Bunzl could 
terminate her at any time. R. 303-304. Moreover, at the time 
of her hire, plaintiff also read and signed the Employee 
Checklist which clearly states that her employment could be 
"terminated at will." R. 364. Plaintiff's signature on this 
document indicates that she, in fact, was conscious from the 
beginning of her employment that she could be terminated at-
will. 
In addition, pursuant to the language in the Handbook 
itself, plaintiff was clearly bound by its terms. Plaintiff 
admits that at the time she began working for Bunzl, she knew the 
Employee Handbook was forthcoming and that it would outline the 
company's procedures on termination and discipline. R. 306-307. 
She admits she received and read the Handbook when it was 
published in April, 1987. R. 309. The Handbook states that it 
"supersedes the terms and conditions of any previous plans, 
policies, rules and procedures." R. 370. It goes on to state in 
two different places that employment is "at-will." R. 372, 384. 
Finally, it expressly states that, "[n]o employee may rely that a 
program of progressive discipline is in effect . . . •" R. 384. 
These provisions specifically override any implications which 
could be drawn from Mr. Frank's statement, even though the 
handbook was published later. Since the Handbook terms 
superseded any previous policies, the Handbook was applicable to 
all employees, regardless of their starting dates. 
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Additionally, by continuing her employment, plaintiff 
impliedly accepted the terms of the Handbook. In Foley v. 
Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. 
Rptr. 211 (1988), the California Supreme Court held that an 
employment manual can be interpreted as an offer for a unilateral 
contract. An employee can impliedly accept that offer by 
continuing to work. This court said essentially the same in 
Berube, stating that continued service after the publication of a 
handbook is sufficient consideration to make the additional terms 
part of the employment contract. 771 P.2d at 1044-45. 
Therefore, by continuing to work, plaintiff accepted the "offer" 
formed by the Handbook and impliedly agreed to be bound by it. 
2. Given the existence of the written Employee 
Checklist and Employee Handbook, evidence of an 
inconsistent oral statement is insufficient to 
preclude summary judgment. 
The Employee Handbook and Employee Checklist are written, 
affirmative expressions of the company's intention to preserve 
the at-will relationship. Other jurisdictions have ruled on this 
issue and held that, as a matter of law, written publications of 
the company's at-will policy prevail over oral statements that 
attempt to limit it. In Lofvendahl v. Barclays American Corp., 5 
IER Cases (B.N.A) 821 (CD. Cal. 1990),2 the plaintiff submitted 
evidence that during his interviews, he was given oral assurances 
2
 A copy of this case is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
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that as long as he "carried out his duties, he would have a job." 
Id. at 824. He claimed that the oral representations created an 
implied-in-fact agreement that he would only be terminated for 
cause. Barclays, however, submitted a copy of its Employee 
Handbook, which clearly stated that employment with the company 
was at-will and that an employee could be terminated with or 
without cause at any time. The court held that in view of the 
Handbook, with its specific at-will provisions, any evidence of 
oral statements or implied-in-fact agreements inconsistent with 
the Handbook would constitute a mere "scintilla" of evidence too 
insignificant to preclude summary judgment. Id. (citing Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-252 (1986)). See also 
Wing v. Anchor Media Ltd. of Texas, 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 570 
N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (1991) (written statements which unequivocally 
[set forth] that employment is "terminable at the will of the 
employer" bar a finding that the employment relationship is other 
than at-will); Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 IER 
Cases (B.N.A.) 1453 (S.C., County Ct. C.P. 1989)3 (defendant 
company negated any contractual effect of prior oral statements 
by notifying plaintiff in writing that employment was at-will). 
In a recent decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals, also 
held that a company's written statements—not oral 
representations—are its controlling policy. Grow v. General 
3
 A copy of this case is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
-16-
Products, 184 Mich. App. 379, 457 N.W.2d 167 (1990). There, the 
plaintiff claimed that oral statements such as, "you have a good 
future here," and "you have expertise," created an implied-in-
fact agreement that his employment could only be terminated for 
cause. However, the company had issued a memorandum that clearly 
and unambiguously stated that employment could be terminated with 
or without cause, at any time. The court therefore held that in 
light of the clear statement of the at-will policy in the 
memorandum, plaintiff's reliance on the oral statements was 
unjustifiable as a matter of law. Id. at 381, 457 N.W.2d at 770. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed this issue in 
Caldwell v. Ford Bacon & Davis, 777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989), in 
which the court focused on the written policies of the company, 
not the alleged oral representations. The defendant in Caldwell 
had a written employment manual which outlined a detailed 
procedure for discharging employees for cause. The manual stated 
that involuntary terminations could be carried out without 
notice. However, the plaintiff testified that he was told in his 
hiring interview that an employee could only be terminated for 
cause after first receiving three letters or three warnings. 
Plaintiff was later terminated without notice. 
The Utah Supreme Court followed its Berube decision and held 
that a factual question existed as to whether the employment 
manual formed a term of employment. Significantly, the court 
declined to even mention the oral representations as having any 
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force to rebut the at-will presumption. The court did hold, 
however, that summary judgment was appropriate because the 
employer properly followed the provisions of the handbook in 
terminating the plaintiff. 
Similarly, in this case, during the employment interview, 
Mr. Frank allegedly promised plaintiff that employees would not 
be terminated without an opportunity to correct deficiencies; 
however, neither the Employee Checklist nor the subsequent 
Handbook mentioned such a policy. Instead, they clearly 
emphasized that employment with Bunzl was at-will, negating any 
prior oral statements to the contrary. Therefore, the evidence 
regarding the alleged oral representation is insufficient to 
create a question of fact. Moreover, Bunzl followed the express 
terms of its Employee Handbook in terminating plaintiff's 
employment by paying plaintiff two-weeks' severance pay at the 
time of her termination. This is the only procedure, aside from 
the at-will policy, provided in the Handbook. Therefore, based 
on Caldwell, because Bunzl properly followed the provisions of 
its Handbook in terminating plaintiff, it was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
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3. The alleged oral statement of Mr. Frank was vague, 
ambiguous, and insufficient to create an implied-
in-fact agreement. 
Assuming Mr. Frank made the alleged oral statement, 
defendants were still entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Even absent the Checklist or Handbook provisions outlining the 
at-will policy, Mr. Frank's oral statement was so vague and 
ambiguous that it lacked the force to rebut the presumption of 
at-will, and it did not merit plaintiff's reliance that she would 
be given a chance to correct deficiencies before termination. In 
Aberman v. Maiden Mills Indus., 414 N.W.2d 769 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that statements such 
as, "permanent employment," "life employment," and "we are 
offering you security" were too vague to create a contract for 
anything other than at-will employment. The court declared that 
"oral, uncorroborated, vague in important details, and highly 
improbable statements" are not sufficient to change at-will 
employment status. Id. at 771. 
In Sanders v. Amerihealth, 898 F.2d 131 (11th Cir. 1990), 
the company president told the plaintiff during a pre-employment 
interview that "as long as you do a good job for me, you've got a 
good future with this company." However, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that the statement was too general and vague to have the 
sufficient contractual effect to abrogate the plaintiff's at-
will status. 
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The Utah Supreme Court faced a similar claim in Rose v. 
Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986). There, the 
plaintiff contended that he relied on the employer's promise on 
two separate occasions that the plaintiff could return to school 
and still continue his employment. When the employer determined 
that school was interfering with plaintiff's work 
responsibilities, he was discharged. The Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the summary judgment granted in the employer's favor, 
noting that the plaintiff was an at-will employee and to prevail 
on a wrongful discharge claim requires more than the plaintiff's 
"subjective understanding that the brief conversations [with his 
employer] became a binding obligation not to terminate him." Id. 
at 87. 
Rose presents a much more compelling argument than the 
present case. In Rose, the plaintiff had two conversations with 
his supervisor after his hire, as opposed to one vague, 
generalized statement made during a pre-hire interview. The 
plaintiff in Rose also had his employer's specific assent to 
return to school. Here the alleged statement by Mr. Frank did 
not specifically set out what the company would do to give an 
employee an opportunity to correct job deficiencies. 
In Aberman and Sanders the oral statements, although deemed 
too vague to form a contract, were also more specific than 
Mr. Frank's ambiguous comment, which was merely a response to 
plaintiff's question whether employees would be given an 
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opportunity to correct work deficiencies. Mr. Frank added, "we 
have procedures that we follow for disciplinary action." R. 304. 
However, he did not mention what those specific procedures were. 
Nor did he mention any specific details as to how employees would 
receive notice or warnings, whether the warnings would be written 
or oral, or a specific time period allotted for the corrective 
action to take place. In short, he gave no specific outline of 
the company's discipline procedure. If the oral statements in 
JRose, Aberman, and Sanders lacked contractual force, then Mr. 
Frank's alleged oral statement, which was also general, vague, 
and susceptible to plaintiff's subjective understanding, had no 
power to create an implied-in-fact agreement, particularly in the 
face of clear written language to the contrary. 
B. If the Employee Checklist and Employee Handbook State 
that Employment is At-Will, Limited Instances of 
Written or Oral Warnings to Other Employees do not 
Alter Plaintiff's At-Will Status. 
An employer's practices and conduct do not abrogate its at-
will rights. Even if Bunzl did, in fact, give some employees 
warnings or probation, such conduct would not change plaintiff's 
at-will status. In Bruno v. Plateau Mining Co., 747 P.2d 1055 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), the plaintiff, who was terminated for 
fighting inside a mine, claimed that Plateau had a de facto 
policy of not terminating employees for fighting; he even 
submitted affidavits from co-workers who knew of no Plateau 
employees who had been terminated for fighting. The court 
stated, however, that even if the company did have such a policy, 
that was not "enough to establish Plateau's intentional surrender 
of its right to terminate [plaintiff's] employment at will." 747 
P.2d at 1058. The court also held as a matter of law that even 
if the allegations were true, they were insufficient to create an 
implied-in-fact agreement, and summary judgment was therefore 
appropriate. Id. 
Bruno is analogous to the present case. Simply because 
Bunzl management issued written or oral warnings to four other 
employees, no implied-in-fact agreement was ever created that 
plaintiff would be treated in the same manner. Past actions do 
not automatically abrogate an employer's right to terminate at 
will. 
Again, Lofvendahl v. Barclays American Corp., 5 IER Cases 
(B.N.A) 821 (CD. Cal. 1990), is on point. There, the plaintiff 
claimed that in addition to receiving oral assurances of job 
security, Barclays had a standard practice of terminating 
employees for cause only, and that this course of conduct created 
an implied-in-fact agreement that he would be terminated only for 
cause. The court answered this question as it did the issue of 
oral representations: in the face of a handbook that clearly 
states that employment is at-will, evidence of inconsistent 
course of conduct is insufficient to create a question of fact. 
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The employer was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Id. at 824. 
Similarly, in the present case, any evidence'of contrary 
conduct becomes irrelevant in view of the terms of the handbook. 
Even if Bunzl did issue warnings to a few other employees and 
give them opportunities to improve, the fact that the handbook 
expressly stated that employment was at-will means that the 
trier-of-fact could not reasonably find any implied-in-fact 
agreement contrary to the at-will policy. The trial court 
therefore correctly granted summary judgment. 
Plaintiff may argue that language in Brehanv v. Nordstrom, 
Inc., 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 1991) indicates that evidence of 
"employer's course of conduct" is relevant. Again that evidence 
is only relevant n[i]f the terms of the manual do purport to 
limit [the company's] power to discharge [at-will]." 161 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 11. Since the Bunzl Handbook, as well as the 
Employee Checklist, affirms the at-will policy, the evidence of 
Bunzl*s course of conduct is not relevant. 
C. Even if the Oral Statements and/or Course of Conduct 
did Create an Implied-in-Fact Agreement, Plaintiff was 
Aware of Her Deficiencies and Given Abundant 
Opportunity to Correct Them Prior to Her Termination. 
Repeated visits from Bunzlfs corporate personnel were 
sufficient notification to plaintiff that her performance was 
unsatisfactory, and Bunzl afforded her ample opportunity to 
correct those deficiencies. The undisputed facts establish that 
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plaintiff was aware that her tardiness was creating problems for 
Bunzl's corporate offices. R. 314-315. She admits that she was 
routinely seeking extensions of the closing deadline by November 
1987, and that her reports for January, February, March and 
April, 1988, were all late. R. 313-314. She also admits she 
knew this was a major problem and concern for Debra Scott, 
Bunzl's regional controller. R. 321-324. 
The problem was so severe that Debra Scott made three trips 
to Salt Lake City to address this problem; Trina Travis, another 
Bunzl employee, also came to Salt Lake City to assist plaintiff 
in timely finishing the closings. R. 313, 317-318, 321-324, 329-
330. Bunzl also hired temporary employees for two-week periods 
in both February and March of 1988, to help plaintiff. R. 324-
326, 341-345, 346-358. 
Debra Scott and the other corporate personnel were not 
making routine training or inspection visits. Rather, they came 
with the specific intent to help plaintiff overcome her 
deficiencies and "streamline" the office procedures. R. 313, 
317-318, 362. 
Those visits, especially in light of comments such as "we 
don't have two days" (R. 322), and "I have to have those 
closings" (R. 314-315) were sufficient to put plaintiff on notice 
that her performance was inadequate and that unless she made 
significant improvement, she would be replaced. Plaintiff, in 
fact, admits that she knew her deficiencies were a problem. R. 
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321-324. Bunzl endured the problem for seven months from 
November 1987 to May 20, 1988, giving her abundant opportunity to 
make improvement and correct her deficiencies. See R. 372. 
Thus, even if Bunzl had an implied-in-fact agreement not to 
dismiss plaintiff without giving her an opportunity to correct 
her job deficiencies, Bunzl complied with that obligation based 
on the undisputed facts of this case. 
Moreover, at the time of termination, Bunzl correctly 
followed the only applicable termination procedure set forth in 
the Employee Handbook. Because plaintiff was a full-time 
employee with more than twelve months service, Bunzl paid her two 
weeks1 severance pay. See R. 340. 
POINT II. 
THIS CASE DOES NOT WARRANT AN OVERRULING OF RECENT, 
ESTABLISHED UTAH CASE LAW. 
Plaintiff states without any substantial support or analysis 
that the present case justifies "a modification of the language 
and decisions in Utah cases" concerning employment relations. 
(Appellant's Brief at p.6). However, defendants assert that the 
logic and language of recent Utah Supreme Court decisions are 
directly applicable to the present case and affirm that summary 
judgment was appropriate. 
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A. The Utah Supreme Court has Declared that No Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exists in an 
At-Will Employment Relationship. 
In Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd,, 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989), 
this court, by a three to two vote, declined to recognize an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception to the 
at-will rule. Subsequently, in Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 
P.2d 1096, 1097 (Utah 1989), this court refused to recognize a 
cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing that would limit an employer's right to 
terminate an at-will employee. Finally, in Nordstrom, supra, 
this court unanimously declared that absent any express terms 
limiting the employer's right to terminate at-will, there is no 
cause of action for alleged breach of an implied-in-law covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. 161 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10-11. 
Therefore, no such covenant exists in the present case, and 
summary judgment was appropriate on this issue. 
B. Plaintiff's Defamation Claim is Barred Because the 
Undisputed Facts Establish that the Alleged Defamatory 
Statement is Not Slander Per Se, Plaintiff has Suffered 
No Special Damages, and there was No Publication of the 
Alleged Defamatory Statement to Third Parties. 
Plaintiff alleges a cause of action for defamation, claiming 
that "her discharge for unacceptable performance constitutes a 
defamation of her in her business and professional capacities." 
R. 8. 
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An action for defamation will not lie unless the plaintiff 
has suffered special damages or, alternatively, the statements 
complained of amount to slander per se. Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 
318, 320-21 (Utah 1979). Special damages are those "particular 
items of damages which result from circumstances peculiar to the 
case at hand," and should be specially pled. Prince v. Peterson, 
538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975). 
In this case, plaintiff does not allege statements that 
amount to slander per se. The only alleged defamatory statement 
of which plaintiff complains is her termination letter, in which 
Carl Kruse stated that her performance was "unacceptable.ff R. 
338, 388. Words that merely impute poor business practices are 
insufficient to support a claim of slander per se. Baum v. 
Gillman, 667 P.2d 41, 43 (Utah 1983) (statements concerning 
plaintiff's inabilities regarding his profession, that he was 
deeply in debt, involved in business related litigation, failed 
to make promised payments and used other's money to pay his 
creditors were not slanderous per se). Accordingly, a discharge 
for "unacceptable performance" is not per se slanderous as a 
matter of law. 
Given the fact that the alleged defamatory statement is not 
slanderous per se, plaintiff must plead and prove that she has 
suffered special damages. However, nowhere in her Complaint does 
she make such an allegation and, as a result, her defamation 
claim is defective. 
-27-
Plaintiff also fails to allege, and there is no proof of, 
the requisite publication of a defamatory statement to a third-
party. Judge Winder stated the following in Boisiolv v. Morton 
Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 800 (D. Utah 1988), in analyzing 
the pleading requirements of a defamation claim under Utah law, 
Utah law requires that a claim must identify the 
defamatory statement either by its words or words to 
that effect; general conclusory statements are 
inadequate . . . the complaint [must] allege when, 
where and to whom the alleged defamatory statement was 
made. 
Id. at 800 (emphasis added). Plaintiff admits that she has no 
personal knowledge of, and is unaware of, any defamatory 
statements being made by anyone at Bunzl to any other person 
either inside or outside the Bunzl organization. R. 335-339. 
Thus, plaintiff does not allege, nor can she prove, to whom any 
alleged defamatory statements were made and, as a result, utterly 
fails to satisfy the requisite publication element. 
C. Utah does Not Recognize a Common Law Claim for 
Retaliatory Discharge. 
Plaintiff also alleges that her manager terminated her in 
retaliation for her disclosures of local office problems to 
corporate headquarters. See R. 6-7. This claim appears to be 
merely another attempt to allege a wrongful discharge action. 
Significantly, Utah has no common law claim for retaliation. 
Since plaintiff fails to cite any authority for this proposition, 
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and defendants are aware of none, these allegations fail to state 
a cause of action. 
Utah statute does recognize a retaliation claim under the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. S 34-35-1, et sea. 
(1953, as amended), which addresses illegal discrimination based 
on sex, race, age, religion, handicap, or national origin. 
However, such a cause is obviously not applicable to the facts of 
this case and, even if it were, plaintiff has failed to follow 
the procedures to assert a retaliation claim under the Act, and 
the time period for filing such a claim has long expired. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Appellees respectfully request that this court find in its 
favor and affirm the Third District Court's grant of summary 
judgment. 
DATED this 21st day of June, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Max D. tfh^eler 
StanleyLtf. Preston 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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LOFVENDAHL v. BARCLAYS AMERICAN CORP. 5 IER Cases 821 
lantic Nat'l Bank'Merchants, No. 
88-4141, Slip Op. at 14, 1990 W.L. 4622, 
p. 6 (D.N.J. 1990). Where the termina-
tion decision is accompanied by a 
showing of harassment on the part of 
the employer, however, courts have al-
lowed claims for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress to go to the jury. 
Borecki, 694 F.Supp. at 61. 
[2] Although plaintiff claims harass-
ment from March to May 1988 in his 
bnef and complaint, no submission 
was made in conjunction with this mo-
tion which would support the harass-
ment charge. Based upon the record 
before it, it appears to the court that 
defendants' conduct was not suffi-
ciently severe to be considered so out-
rageous and extreme that it exceeds all 
bounds of societal decency. 
Expert testimony is required to sup-
port a claim for an injury which is 
either subjective in nature or of the 
sort that its cause and degree of sever-
ity cannot be determined by laymen. 
Kelly v. Borwegen, 95 N.J.Super. 240, 
243-44 (App. Div. 1967); Mema v. Dia-
mond Jim's., Inc., 145 N.J.Super. 40, 46 (App. Div. 1976). Plaintiff's claims of 
emotional distress, including depres-
sion, sleep loss, embarrassment and 
humiliation are encompassed by this 
category; therefore, expert testimony 
is required to support them. Dondero's 
submissions in opposition to the in-
stant motion were unaccompanied by 
any such testimony. Additionally, 
symptoms similar to Dondero's were 
found to be insufficient to support an 
emotional-distress claim in Buckley, 
111 N.J. at 368. Accordingly, this claim 
also must fail. 
Defendants seek the dismissal of 
Count 11, the CEPA count, solely on 
the ground that it is untimely because 
it was not filed within the statute of 
limitations period. The whistleblower 
statute provides: 
Upon g violation of any of the provisions of 
this act. an aggrieved employee or former 
employee may institute a civil action in a 
court of competent jurisdiction, within one 
year, for relief . . . 
N.J.S.A. 34:19-5. 
[3] Defendants argue that the stafc-
ute of limitations began to run on 
March 18, 1988, the date they notified 
Dondero of his reassignment The 
CEPA count of plaintiff's complaint 
charges that "a determinative factor 
in defendants' decision to discharge 
plaintiff was plaintiff's objecting and 
refusing to engage in () wrongful and 
unlawful acts." (Complaint, Count 11, 
H) This language indicates that 
plaintiff bases his unlawful-retali-
ation claim on a theory of constructive 
discharge, (id), which began with 
plaintiff s reassignment and culmi-
nated with defendants' refusal to ac-
cept Dondero's withdrawal of resigna-
tion. The date on which it became 
clear that Dondero's and defendants' 
regular employment relationship 
would terminate was June 23, 1988, 
the date on which Carol Asselta, Don-
dero's replacement as Director of Hu-
man Resources, informed plaintiff 
that his attempt to withdraw his resig-
nation had been rejected. (Defendants' 
Exhibit G). Therefore, the time within 
which plaintiff had to file a claim for 
retaliatory constructive discharge be-
gan to run on this date. Dondero's 
June 14, 1989, filing of his complaint 
in state court fell within the one-year 
statute of limitations period. Accord-
ingly, plaintiff's CEPA claim is timely 
and will not be dismissed. 
For the foregoing reasons, defen-
dants' motion is granted in part and 
denied in part: the motion for sum-
mary judgment on Count 1 is granted, 
and the motion for summary Judg-
ment on Count 11 is dismissed. An or-
der accompanies this opinion. No 
costs. 
Order 
This matter having come before the 
court on motion by defendants, Lenox 
China, Richard L. Lewis and Anthony 
L. Barth, for summary judgment on 
Counts 8 and 11 of the complaint here-
in; and the court having considered 
the written submission and oral argu-
ment of counsel; and good cause ap-
pearing, 
IT IS on this 19th day of June, 1990, 
ORDERED that defendant's motion 
be granted with respect to Count 8 and 
denied with respect to Count 11; and it 
is further 
ORDERED that Count 8 of the com-
plaint filed herein be and hereby is 
dismissed. 
LOFVENDAHL T. BARCLAYS 
AMERICAN CORP. 
VS. District Court, 
Central District of California 
LOFVENDAHL v. BARCLAYS 
AMERICAN CORPORATION, et al., 
No. CV 89-3228-RSWL, April 17, 1990 
CONTRACTS 
1. Discharge — Breach — National 
Banking Act H00.07 M50.1205 
Bank that submitted no evidence 
that officer was discharged by board of 
5 IER Cases 822 LOFVENDAHL v. BARCLAYS AMERICAN CORP. 
directors may not rely on at-pleasure 
provision of National Banking Act in 
defense of breach-of-contract claim. 
2. Discharge — Breach — Disclaim-
er — Summary judgment •450.1205 
•450.09 *515.15 
In light of clear at-will disclaimers 
in application form and employee 
handbook, discharged employee's evi-
dence that supervisor offered him 
long-term employment when he was 
hired constitutes mere ''scintilla of 
evidence" of implied or express for-
cause contract, which is insufficient to 
avoid summary Judgment for employ-
er. 
3. Discharge — Reduction in force — 
Summary Judgment »450.1205 
•200.1565 >515.15 
Employee whose position was elimi-
nated during reduction in force was 
discharged for cause and has no claim 
for breach of contract; evidence shows 
that bank had stopped servicing most 
of its customers, and fact that cutback 
was not discussed with his supervisor 
and that supervisor was shocked to 
learn of it constitutes mere "scintilla 
of evidence" that cutback was not for 
legitimate business reasons, which is 
insufficient to avoid summary judg-
ment for employer. 
PUBLIC POLICY 
4. Reporting misconduct of co-work-
er to police •425.0301 
Employee fails to state claim for dis-
charge in violation of public policy, 
where he was terminated after report-
ing to police that his supervisor had 
struck him during fistfight; weight of 
evidence shows that employee was dis-
charged when his position was elimi-
nated during reduction in force. 
TORTS 
5. Exclusivity of remedies — Inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress 
•505.11 ^400.03 
Employee's claim that his discharge 
caused him emotional distress is 
barred by exclusivity provision of 
worker's compensation act, since ter-
mination is part of normal business 
relationship. 
DAMAGES 
6. Punitive damages — Discharge 
•610.0307 
Employee whose position was elimi-
nated during reduction in force failed 
to show that employer acted with op-
pression or malice in discharging him, 
and punitive-damages claim is not 
supported by evidence. 
Michael J. Collins (Meserve Mumper 
& Hughes), Irvine, Calif., for plaintiff. 
Robert L. Lofts and Jan T. Chilton (Severson & Werson), San Francisco, 
Calif., for defendant Barclays. 
Christopher W. Gardner (Glynn & 
Harvey), Pasadena, Calif., for defend-
ant Brewer. 
Full Text of Opinion 
LEW, District Judge: — Defendants 
Barclays American Corporation and 
Barclays Bank of Delaware (hereinaf-
ter "Barclays") have moved for sum-
mary judgment against plaintiff Steve 
Lof vendahl on the first (breach of em-
ployment contract) and second (termi-
nation in violation of public policy) 
claims for relief, that portion of the 
third (intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress) claim for relief which 
arises from LofvendahTs termination 
rather than the alleged assault and 
battery, and that portion of the prayer 
for punitive damages which is based 
on Lofvendahl's termination rather 
than the alleged assault and battery. 
Lofvendahl timely opposed the motion. 
Oral argument was heard on April 16, 
1990. Having considered all of the pa-
pers filed in support of and in opposi-
tion to the motion, and oral argument 
of counsel, the Court hereby issues the 
following order: 
Barclays' motion is GRANTED in its 
entirety. Summary judgment is here-
by rendered in Barclays' favor against 
Lofvendahl on the first and second 
claims for relief, that portion of the 
third claim for relief which arises from 
Lofvendahl's termination rather than 
the alleged assault and battery, and 
that portion of the prayer for punitive 
damages which is based on Lofven-
dahl's termination rather than the al-
leged assault and battery. 
BACKGROUND 
Barclays American Corporation is a 
holding company which owns Bar-
clays Bank of Delaware. Barclays 
Bank of Delaware's sole business is of-
fering private label credit cards 
through retailers. For example, the re-
tailer sells products to consumers on 
credit. Rather than extending that 
credit itself, the retailer contracts with 
Barclays Bank of Delaware to provide 
the necessary credit. Barclays Bank of 
Delaware makes the decision whether 
to extend credit to particular consum-
ers. If the consumer is given credit, he 
or she is issued a credit card, bearing 
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the retailer's name and logo, which 
entitles him or her to secure additional 
credit from Barclays Bank of Dela-
ware for goods or services purchased 
from the retailer. 
Lofvendahl was employed by Bar-
clays Bank of Delaware since 1985 as 
vice president and sales manager for 
the western region of the United 
States, including California. Defend-
ant Raymond Brewer was a senior vice 
president for Barclays Bank of Dela-
ware, and Lofvendahl's immediate su-
perior. On April 17, 1989, Brewer and 
two other Barclays' executives visited 
California for the purpose of checking 
on business, and had dinner with Lof-
vendahl. During and after dinner the 
four men each consumed numerous 
alcoholic beverages. At about mid-
night, the two non-party bank execu-
tives went to their hotel rooms. Brewer 
and Lofvendahl remained and en-
gaged in conversation together. About 
2:00 a.m., Lofvendahl and Brewer left 
and on the way back to their hotel 
rooms they engaged in a brawl/fist-
fight with each other. Lofvendahl re-
ported the incident to the local police. 
Criminal charges were filed against 
Brewer but subsequently dropped. 
Shortly after the incident, both Lof-
vendahl and Brewer were terminated 
by Barclays. Brewer was terminated 
for cause for striking a subordinate. 
Lofvendahl's position was allegedly 
simply eliminated due to market 
forces. Lofvendahl filed this suit alleg-
ing four claims for relief for breach of 
employment contract, termination in 
violation of public policy, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and as-
sault and battery', respectively. Bar-
clays now moves for summary judg-
ment on the first and second claims for 
relief, that portion of the third claim 
for relief which arises from the termi-
nation rather than the alleged assault 
and battery, and that portion of the 
punitive damages prayer which arises 
from Lofvendahl's termination rather 
than the alleged assault and battery*' 
FIRST CLAIM FOR REUEF: 
BREA CH OF EMPLO YMEST 
CONTRACT 
The first claim for relief alleges as 
follows: Lofvendahl was hired by Bar-
clays on October 16, 1985 as vice presi-
dent and western area sales manager. 
During the course of Lofvendahl's em-
ployment, an express and implied-in-
fact employment contract existed be-
tween Lofvendahl and Barclays which 
provided that Lofvendahl would be 
able to continue his employment with 
Barclays indefinitely so long as he car-
ried out his duties in a proper and 
competent manner, that Lofvendahl 
would not be terminated without good 
cause, that Lofvendahl would be given 
written notice of and a meaningful op-
portunity to respond to any com-
plaints lodged against him regarding 
his performance, and that Barclays 
would not eliminate Lofvendahl's posi-
tion with the company without proper 
notice and explanation. This contract 
was evidenced by various wTitten doc-
uments, oral representations and 
course of conduct. Barclays breached 
this contract by terminating Lofven-
dahl in violation of this agreement. 
Barclays argues that it was entitled 
to terminate Lofvendahl without 
cause and, if not, that Lofvendahl was 
terminated for cause. 
National Banking Act 
The National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. §24 (Fifth), provides that a national 
banking association has the power to 
"elect or appoint directors, and by its 
board of directors to appoint a presi-
dent, vice president, cashier, and other 
officers, define their duties, require 
bonds of them and fix the penalty 
thereof, dismiss such officers or any of 
them at pleasure, and appoint others to 
fill their places." [Emphasis added.) 
This provision has been consistently 
interpreted to mean that the board of 
directors of a national bank may dis-
miss an officer without liability for 
breach of the agreement to employ, 
and that any agreement which at-
tempts to circumvent the complete 
discretion of a national bank's board 
of directors to terminate an officer at 
will is void as against public policy. In 
order to be subject to the dismissal 
portion of this section, the employee 
must have been an officer, and must 
have been hired and discharged by the 
board of directors (or by persons au-
thorized by the board to do so). Mackey 
v. Pioneer National Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 
524 (9th Cir. 1989). 
[11 In the instant case, Barclays sub-
mits a copy of the transcript of Lof-
vendahl's deposition wherein Lofven-
dahl testified that he became an 
officer of Barclays when he was ap-
pointed by the board of directors. How-
ever, Barclays submits no evidence 
that Lofvendahl was discharged by the 
Barclays board of directors. Therefore 
summary judgment cannot be granted 
on this ground. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Foley and Fugh 
California Labor Code §2922 pro-
vides in relevant part, "An employ-
ment, having no specified term, mav 
be terminated at the will of either 
party on notice to the other." The 
California Supreme Court in Foley v. 
Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 
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254 Cal.Rptr. 211 13 IER Cases 1729] (1988), explained that pursuant to §2922, If the parties reach no express 
or implied agreement to the contrary, 
the relationship is terminable at any 
time without cause, but when the par-
ties have enforceable expectations 
concerning either the term of employ-
ment or the grounds or manner of ter-
mination, §2922 does not diminish the 
force of such contractual or legal obli-
gations. The presumption that an em-
ployment relationship of indefinite 
duration is intended to be terminable 
at will is subject, like any presump-
tion, to contrary evidence. This may 
take the form of an agreement, express 
or implied, that the employment rela-
tionship will continue indefinitely, 
pending the occurrence of some event 
such as the employer's dissatisfaction 
with the employee's services or the ex-
istence of some cause for termination. 
Factors to consider when determining 
if an implied-in-fact contract exists 
are the personnel policies or practices 
of the employer, the employee's lon-
gevity of service, actions or communi-
cations by the employer reflecting as-
surances of continued employment, 
and the practices of the industry in 
which the employee is engaged. Id. at 
680, 254 Cal.Rptr. at 225; Pugh v. See's 
Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 
324-327, 171 Cal.Rptr. 917 [115 LRRM 
40021(1981). 
Barclays argues that uncontradict-
ed evidence shows that no express or 
implied-in-fact contract existed be-
tween it and Lofvendahl. Barclays 
submits a copy of the employment ap-
plication signed by Lofvendahl which 
provides immediately above the signa-
ture line, 
I agree that if I am employed, my employ-
ment shall not be construed as being for 
any definite period of time, but will be for 
an indefinite period, terminable at will by 
the Company or me. 
Barclays also submit a copy of Bar-
clays* "Employee Handbook/* which 
provides under the heading "Termina-
tion," 
This handbook does not constitute a con-
tract of employment between the Company 
and you. No commitment for employment 
for any specified duration, e.g. 'lifetime', 
•permanent' or 'as long as performance is 
satisfactory* shall be valid or binding on the 
Company unless it is expressly set forth in a 
written document and signed by the em-
ployee and the Chief Executive Officer of 
the Company. Employment and compensa-
tion may be terminated with or without 
cause at any time by the Company or by 
you." 
Lofvendahl testified in his deposition 
that he had read the "Employee Hand-
book." 
In response, Lofvendahl submits a 
copy of the transcript of Brewer's de-
position, wherein the following tran-
spired, 
Q When you hired fLofvendahlJ. did you 
express to him that this was not a tempo-
rary position? 
A. I don't know if I said those exact words, 
but I'm sure for him to leave his Job he 
would have assumed it wasn't a temporary Job. J Q. Did you suggest to him that this was a 
career position? 
A. I would have assumed — yes, air. Q. Did you assure him that he was going 
to be with the bank as long as he fulfilled 
the objectives that the bank expected of 
him? 
A. Maybe not in so much in those words 
but again, when you were trying to hire 
someone who had a present Job, you sold the 
benefits of working for the bank. Q. And one of those benefits that you were 
selling was security? 
A. Yes, sir. 
• • • Q. Under the terms under which you feel 
you were hired, would the bank have the 
right to terminate you in a general elimina-
tion of all sales staff? 
A. . . . I had to assume giving up a ten-
year career with G.E. that I would have Job 
security, that I would relocate on the pre-
tense, I guess, that as long as I did my job I'd 
have a job. . . . So, I would have to say that 
the actions I made were based upon as long 
as I did the job I would have a job. That was 
the same kind of scenario I gave to Mr. 
Lofvendahl who had gainful employment &t 
a very good company . . . 
Lofvendahl also submits his own dec-
laration wherein he states that he was 
never led to believe by any of his supe-
riors that his position with Barclays 
was in Jeopardy. 
{21 Summary judgment must be ren-
dered where the evidence shows that 
there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). There is no issue for trial 
unless there is sufficient evidence fa-
voring the nonmoving party for a jury 
to return a verdict for that party. The 
mere existence of a scintilla of evi-
dence in support of the plaintiff's posi-
tion is insufficient; there must be evi-
dence on which the jury could 
reasonably find for the plaintiff. An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 250-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511-2512, 
01 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The evidence 
submitted bv Lofvendahl (i.e. Brewer's 
and Lofvendahl's testimony) is merely 
a scintilla of evidence in Lofvendahl's 
favor and is insufficient, in view of the 
language in the employment applica-
tion and the "Employee Handbook" set 
forth above, to raise a question of fact 
as to whether an express or implied-in-
fact contract existed between Lofven-
dahl and Barclays whereby Barclays 
agreed not to discharge Lofvendahl 
without cause. If an express contract 
can be found, it provides that Lofven-
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dahl can be terminated at will without 
cause as per the language in the em-
ployment application signed by Lof-
vendahl and the "Employee Hand-
book " With respect to an implied-in-
fact contract and the relevant factors 
set forth in Foley and P%JLQK although 
Brewer's deposition testimony indi-
cates that Brewer may have assured 
Lofvendahl of continued employment, 
the language in the employment ap-
plication and "Employee Handbook** 
clearly shows that Barclays personnel 
policy was that employees were termi-
nable at will with or without cause. In 
addition, Lofvendahl was employed by 
Barclays for a mere three and one-half 
years Based on the evidence submit-
ted the Court finds that there is insuf-
ficient evidence in Lofvendahl's iavor 
to raise a question of fact as to wheth-
er an express or implied-ln-fact con-
tract prohibited Barclays from termi-
nating Lofvendahl without cause. 
Accordingly summary judgment must 
be rendered in Barclays' favor on the 
first claim for relief. 
Terminated for Cause 
Even if Barclays was contractually 
prohibited from terminating Lofven-
dahl at will without cause, summary judgment must be rendered in Bar-
clays' favor because the Court finds 
that Lofvendahl was terminated for 
good cause. 
Under California law, reduction in 
staff to meet market conditions consti-
tutes good cause for termination as a 
matter of law Guxnaculas v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc , 761 F.2d 1391, 1395 
1119 LRRM 3246) (9th Cir 1985), Clut-
ierham v. Coachmen Industries, Inc, 
169 CalApp3d 1223, 1227, 215 
CalRptr. 795, 797 [2 IER Cases 1641 (1985) (Where "uncontradicted evi-
dence showed a legitimate business 
reason for terminating" an employee, 
"|c)ourts must take care not to inter-
fere with the legitimate exercise of 
managerial discretion.") 
Barclays argues that Lofvendahl 
was terminated when his position was 
eliminated due to market forces and 
the lack of profitability of Barclays 
Bank of Delaware's enterprise In sup-
port, Barclays submits the declara-
tions of Richard Farmer, president of 
Barclays Bank of Delaware and a 
member of the board of directors, Dale 
Peters, executive vice-president and 
chief operating officer of Barclays 
American Corporation and a director 
of Barclays Bank of Delaware, Charles 
Davis, vice president of the human re-
•ources department of Barclays Bank 
of Delaware, and Leonard Casano na-
tional field manager for Barclays 
fi*nk of Delaware These declarations 
establish the following. At the time 
Lofvendahl was terminated, Barclays 
Bank of Delaware had been unprofit-
able for some time In an effort to re-
verse that trend, the bank drastically 
reduced the number of dealers it ser-
viced and placed a moratorium on 
signing new dealers Between August 
1988 and May 1989, the number of 
dealers serviced by the western area 
sales region, which Lofvendahl man-
aged, was reduced from 22 to 2. Na-
tionally, by May 31, 1989, Barclays 
Bank serviced only 12 dealers, and it 
was seriously considering terminating 
three of those. The process of termi-
nating dealers continued after Lofven-
dahl was discharged. Barclays Bank 
now services only four dealers nation-
wide As the number of dealers de-
clined, so did Barclays Bank's need for 
sales and marketing personnel to sign 
new dealers and service existing ones. 
Barclays Bank closed its western area 
office in September 1988 and laid off 
five of the seven employees under 
plaintiff in the region. Staff in the 
eastern and central areas was also cut. 
The bank felt there was no need to pay 
Lofvendahl, or someone else in his po-
sition, $70,000 per year to supervise 
two sales representatives and, with 
their help, service two dealers The em-
ployee to whom Lofvendahl's duties 
were assigned after his suspension was 
able to perform all of those new duties 
in about five days a month In or 
about February 1989, Farmer and Pe-
ters discussed the fact that Lofvendahl 
would have to be terminated when the 
number of dealers reached a suffi-
ciently low level At the beginning of 
April 1989, the bank's sales staff was 
headed by a national sales manager. 
Brewer, and three area sales manag-
ers, Lofvendahl and two others All 
four positions have now been eliminate 
ed, and the bank no longer employs 
sales personnel. 
In opposition, Lofvendahl argues 
that business necessity and market 
forces was just a pretext for Lofven-
dahl's termination Lofvendahl points 
out that Brewer testified in his deposi-
tion that he was ••shocked** when he 
heard that Lofvendahl's position had 
been eliminated because Brewer "was 
his direct supervisor, and I ] was on the 
senior management team that any de-
cision of that magnitude would have 
been discussed at a senior manage-
ment meeting And it had never been 
discussed " Brewer also submits a copy 
of a memorandum memorializing a 
conversation between Farmer and Da-
vis on April 20, 1989 regarding the 
April 17, 1989 incident, wherein the 
business necessity for terminating 
Lofvendahl was never discussed 
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13] As explained above, summary 
Judgment must be rendered where the 
evidence shows that there is no genu-
ine issue of material fact and the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
There is no issue for trial unless there 
is sufficient evidence favoring the 
nonmoving party for a jury to return a 
verdict for that party. The mere exis-
tence of a scintilla of evidence in sup-
port of the plaintiff's position is insuf-
ficient; there must be evidence on 
which the Jury could reasonably find 
for the plaintiff. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 250-252, 106 
SCt. 2505, 2511-2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Here, the fact that Brewer was 
shocked *hen he learned Lofvendahl's 
position had been eliminated, and the 
fact that the alleged legitimate busi-
ness reason for eliminating Lofven-
dahl's position was not discussed in a 
single memorandum memorializing a 
single conversation between Farmer 
and Davis, is merely a scintilla of evi-
dence that Lofvendahrs position was 
not terminated due to legitimate busi-
ness reasons when considered with the 
declaration testimony of four of Bar-
clays' top executives The Court finds 
that the evidence submitted would be 
insufficient to support a finding by a 
reasonable Jury that Lofvendahl was 
terminated for a reason other than 
business necessity. Accordingly sum-
mary Judgment must be rendered in 
Barclays' favor. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
TERMINATION IN VIOLATION 
OF PUBLIC POLICY 
[4] The second claim for relief alleges 
that public policy encourages citizens 
to report criminal conduct to proper 
state authorities, and that upon Bar-
clays' learning of Lofvendahl's report-
ing the conduct of Brewer to the po-
lice, Barclays terminated Lofvendahl's 
employment in order to punish Lof-
vendahl for that conduct, which ter-
mination was violative of public poli-
cy. 
As stated above, the Court finds that 
the evidence submitted would be in-
sufficient to support a finding by a 
reasonable Jury that Lofvendahl was 
terminated for a reason other than 
business necessity. Therefore sum-
mary Judgment must be rendered in 
Barclays' favor on the second claim for 
relief. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
The third claim for relief alleges 
that Lofvendahl suffered emotional 
distress from the alleged assault and 
battery and from his termination. 
Barclays moves for summary Judg-
ment on the third claim for relief ex-
cept that portion that arises from the 
alleged assault and battery, arguing 
that such claim is within the exclusive 
Jurisdiction of the Workers* Compen-
sation Board. 
The proper test is whether the acts 
alleged were part of the normal em-
ployment relationship. When employ-
ers step out of their roles as such and 
commit acts which do not fall within 
the reasonable anticipated conditions 
of work, they may not then hide be-
hind the shield of workers* compensa-
tion. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection 
District, 43 Cal.3d 148, 233 Cal.Rptr. 
308 [1 IER Cases 1644] (1987); Hart v. 
National Mortgage & Land Co., 189 CaL 
App.3d 1420, 235 Cal.Rptr. 68 (1987), 
Semore v. Pool, Cal.App.3d , 
266 Cal.Rptr. 280 [5 IER Cases 129] (1990). 
[5] As stated above, the Court finds 
that the evidence submitted would be 
insufficient to support a finding by a 
reasonable jury that Lofvendahl was 
terminated for a reason other than le-
gitimate business necessity. This act 
was clearly part of the normal employ-
ment relationship in that Barclays did 
not step out of their roles as employers 
and commit acts not within the antici-
pated conditions of work. Thus this 
claim is within the exclusive Jurisdic-
tion of the Workers* Compensation 
Board. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES PRAYER 
[6] Lofvendahl in the operative com-
plaint prays for punitive damages, and 
alleges in all four claims for relief that 
Barclays acted with malice and op-
J>ression. Barclays moves for summary udgment on that portion of the puni-
tive damage prayer arising from Lof-
vendahl's termination rather than the 
alleged assault and battery. Again, the 
Court finds that the evidence submit-
ted would be insufficient to support a 
finding by a reasonable Jury that Lof-
vendahl was terminated for a reason 
other than legitimate business necessi-
ty. The Court further finds that there 
is no evidence that Barclays acted 
with oppression or malice with respect 
to Lofvendahl's termination. Sum-
mary Judgment must therefore be ren-
dered in Barclays' favor on this issue. 
IT IS BO ORDERED. 
Addendum B 
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the performance of plaintiffs Toth and 
Branham was inferior to others in the 
same areas and their Jobs could more 
easily be eliminated without serious 
disruption. Affidavit of John E. Menk-
haus; (2) plaintiff Threatt had the low-
est supervisory performance rating in 
the factory, Affidavit of John E. Menk-
haus; (3) plaintiff Snyder was selected 
because of performance problems, 
technical limitations and because he 
was less proficient in certain areas 
than another employee in his section, 
Affidavit of Charles L. Kuckuck; (4) 
plaintiff Newton's performance was 
substantially inferior to the perform-
ance of the three other technicians in 
her department, Affidavit of Dwight 
D. Morgan; (5) plaintiff Bean could not 
get along with other managers and 
was very defensive when criticized, Af-
fidavit of John E. Menkhaus; (6) plain-
tiff Hilley's duties had decreased in 
recent years because of "changes in 
manufacturing philosophies" and his 
remaining duties could easily be divid-
ed among other employees, Affidavit of 
Charles Bauer; (7) plaintiff Gallo "was 
selected for layoff due to his poor job 
performance in comparison with other 
factory supervisors," Affidavit of John 
E. Menkhaus; and (8) plaintiff Eames's 
performance was inferior to that of 
the other four clerks in her depart-
ment, Affidavit of William H. Rider. 
Because the ADEA plaintiffs have not 
produced any evidence that these le-
gitimate reasons for the ADEA plain-
tiffs' lay-offs are merely pretextual, 
the Court concludes summary judg-
ment for the defendant is appropriate 
on the causes of action for violation of 
the ADEA.15 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court 
grants the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on the claims for 
outrage in all of these consolidated 
cases and on the claims for violation of 
the ADEA in C.A. Nos. 87-1998, 
87-1999, 87-2000, 87-2002, 87-2004-16, 
87-2005, 87-2006, 87-2007, and 
87-2515. The Court denies the defen-
dant's motion insofar as it seeks sum-
mary judgment on any of the plain-
" The Court's conclusion that the defendant has 
succeeded in rebutting a pnma facie case of a*e 
discrimination is not inconsistent with its earlier 
holding that the defendant failed to establish as a 
matter of la* that the plaintifis did not possess the 
requisite qualifications to enjoy the protection of 
the handbook provisions See supra Pan 1(C). The 
fact that the ADEA plaintiffs were less qualified 
than others in their departments or that their jobs 
could more easily be eliminated than others' is a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for laying 
them off Those facts, however, do not render them 
"unqualified under the handbook provisions 
aruch make no mention of comparative qualifica-
tions See supra note 7. 
tiffs' claims for breach of an 
employment contract. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
ALLAN v. SUNBELT COCA-COLA 
BOTTLING CO. 
South Carolina 
Court of Common Pleas 
Dorchester County 
ALLAN v. SUNBELT COCA-COLA 
BOTTLING COMPANY, INC., No. 88-
CP-18-936, August 15, 1989 
CONTRACTS 
1. Covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing *450.I203 »400.13 
South Carolina does not recognize 
cause of action for breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in at-will employment contracts. 
TORTS 
2. Fraudulent breach of contract 
•400.05 *275.08 
Warehouse manager who was laid 
off during economic cutback failed to 
state claim for fraud accompanying 
alleged breach of contract; there was 
no evidence of fraudulent intent, or 
that reason for layoff was pretextual. 
CONTRACTS 
3. Handbook — Lack of specificity 
•450.1205 
Handbook that recited company's 
policy of assisting employees in devel-
oping themselves for future opportu-
nities and of trying to provide perma-
nent work under normal business 
conditions is not specific enough to 
alter employees' at-will status. 
4. Employer promises •450.1205 
Vague oral assurances about job se-
curity by company owners were insuf-
ficient to create contract altering em-
ployee's at-will status; subsequent 
handbook containing all employment 
policies did not include just-cause pro-
vision, and oral statements were not 
adopted by employer that purchased 
company. 
5. Unilateral modification — Dis-
claimers •450.1205 ^450.25 
Employer negated any contractual 
effect of prior employer's handbook 
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and oral assurances by issuing con-
spicuous disclaimers on employment 
application and notice of company 
policies employer's unilateral modifi-
cation of just-cause termination policy 
to one of at-will does not require em-
ployee's express assent, and employee's 
return to work constitutes acceptance 
of and consideration for change. 
€. Reduction in force — Just cause 
lor layoff »450.1205 »200.1565 >275.08 
Employer did not breach any just-
cause contract by laying oil ware-
house supervisor during reduction In 
force, economically motivated cutback 
constituted just cause for discharge. 
C Steven Moskos, Charleston, 6 C, 
for plaintiff 
Charles T. Speth n and M Susan 
Eglin (Haynsuorth, Baldwin, Johnson 
and Greaves), Greenville, S C., for de-
fendant 
Full Text of Opinion 
BROWN, Presiding Judge — This 
matter *as tned before this Court on 
July 17-19, 1989 Defendant Sunbelt 
Coca-Cola Bottling Company moved 
for Directed Verdict after the close of 
Plaintiffs case, and again after the 
close of all the evidence For the rea-
sons set forth below, the Court grants 
Defendant's Motion for Directed Ver-
dict as to all causes of action 
FACTS 
Plaintiff Michael C Allan was cm-
plo\ed by Dorchester Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Company (hereinafter "Dorches-
ter") beginning March 26, 1973. 
Defendant Sunbelt purchased the 
stock of Dorchester on May 31, 1985. 
On March 23 1980, Plaintiff was per-
manently laid off when his position of 
Day Warehouse Manager was elimi-
nated as part of an ongoing company-
wide economic cutback 
Plaintiff alleged that his termina-
tion breached a contract of employ-
ment which allegedly existed between 
himself and Defendant based on an 
employee handbook and various oral 
assurances made by the present and 
pnor owners of Dorchester. 
The handbook upon which Plaintiff 
based his claim was distributed in 1981 
by the then-ouners of Dorchester. 
Plaintiff relied on the following provi-
sions 
It is the operating philosophy of this Company that each employee be treated 
with indiMdual dignity and made a contrib-
uting member of the organization The Company in its obligations to its employ-
ees aets forth the following principles by 
which both the Company and the employee 
can join in contributing to future job secu-
rity and individual growth. 
• • • 
6) That to the extent possible the Company 
will assist employees in developing them-
•elves for future opportunities. 
6) That employees shall be promoted on the 
basis of demonstrated ability and loyalty. 
7) That the Company will try insofar ai 
possible to provide permanent, steady work 
to all employees subject to its normal busi-
ness conditions 
The handbook did not contain specific 
procedures as to how layoffs should be 
conducted. 
In early June, following the pur-
chase of Dorchester by Sunbelt, an 
employee meeting was held in the Dor-
chester warehouse to discuss the sale 
with emplovees. Homer Durrous, 
Chairman of the Board of Sunbelt, 
spoke at this meeting It was undisput-
ed that no guarantees of permanent 
employment were made at this meet-
ing Furthermore, nothing was said at 
the meeting with regard to the Dor-
chester handbook or personnel poli-
cies. 
During his employment by Sunbelt, 
Plaintiff received two statements 
which notified him that his employ-
ment with Sunbelt was at will and 
could be terminated at any time The 
first such statement appeared on an 
employment application completed by 
Plaintiff in October 1985 The follow-
ing statement appears directly above 
the signature line. 
FURTHER, I UNDERSTAND AND 
AGREE THAT MY EMPLOYMENT IS 
FOR NO DEFINITE PERIOD AND MAY. 
REGARDLESS OF THE DATE OF PAY-
MENT OF MY WAGES AND SALARY BE 
TERMINATED AT ANY TIME WITHOUT 
ANY PREVIOUS NOTICE. 
While Plaintiff denied signing the ap-
plication, he admitted that he received 
The second disclaimer was presented 
to Plaintiff on March 8, 1988 This no-
tice contained Company policies de-
scribing hours of work, method of pay-
ment, vacations, holidays, severance 
pay, and sick leave, and Included the 
following provision directly above 
Plaintiff's signature: 
7. These policies are SOT a contract of 
employment The provisions of our person-
nel policies are subject to change at any 
time by Sunbelt Coca-Cols Bottling Com-
pany Notwithstanding any of the provi-
sions of any personnel policj all employees 
of Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Company are 
"employees-at-wilT who may quit at any 
time for any or no reason and who may be 
terminated at any time for any or no rea-
son 
(Emphasis In original) Plaintiff ad-
mitted that he received the notifica-
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tion, signed it, and understood its 
meaning. 
The uncontested evidence showed 
that Plaintiff and other employees at 
Defendant's Summerville and 
Charleston facilities were laid off on 
March 23 for economic reasons. De-
fendant presented unrebutted testi-
mony that Plaintiff's former job posi-
tion remains unfilled to this date and 
that the warehouse is operating effi-
ciently despite the job elimination. 
Prior to his termination, Company of-
ficials attempted to find Plaintiff an-
other position within the Company. 
However, no position was available for 
which Plaintiff, in the judgment of 
management, was qualified. 
I. Plaintiff Presented No Evidence That 
Defendant Violated The South Carolina 
Wage Payment Statute. 
South Carolina Code Section 
41-10-50 provides as follows: 
Whenever an employer separates an em-
ployee from the payroll for any reason, the 
employer shall pay all wages due to the 
employee within forty-eight hours of the 
time of separation- or the next regular pay-
day which may not exceed thirty days after 
written notice is given. 
"Wages" includes "vacation, holiday, 
sick leave, and severance payments 
which are due to an employee under 
any employer policy or employment 
contract." S.C. Code Ann. §41-10-10 (Supp. 1988). 
Plaintiff claimed that Defendant 
violated the South Carolina wage pay-
ment statute by not paying him for 61 
days of sick leave which he did not use 
prior to his termination. Plaintiff, 
however, failed to present any evi-
dence of an employer policy, an em-
ployment contract, or a past practice 
of paying departing employees for un-
used sick leave. Plaintiff, in fact, con-
ceded that in certain instances, such 
as voluntary quits, employees should 
not be paid for unused sick leave. The 
absence of proof as to any policy, prac-
tice, or agreement to pay employees for 
unused sick leave necessitates dismiss-
al of this cause of action. 
n. South Carolina Does Sot Recognise 
A Separate Cause of Action For Breach 
o/ Implied Covenant of Good Faith And 
Fair Dealing In The Employment Con-
text. 
11} South Carolina has recognized 
implied covenants of good faith and 
fair dealing in commercial contracts. 
See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nelson 
Motors, Inc., 247 S.C. 360, 147 S.E.2d 
481 (1966); Tharpe v. G.£. Moore Co., 
254 S.C. 196, 174 S.E.2d 397 (1970). No 
South Carolina court has recognized 
such a covenant in at-will employ-
ment contracts. Satterfield v. Lockheed 
Missiles & Space Co., 617 F.Supp. 1359, 
1364 (D.SC. 1985). Consequently, no 
separate cause of action exists for 
breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
Even if South Carolina were to rec-
ognize such a covenant in employment 
contracts, there was no breach in the 
present case inasmuch as Sunbelt dis-
charged Plaintiff under an express 
provision of the handbook. There is no 
evidence of anything but that Plain-
tiff was terminated in an economic 
layoff. Within the contract as alleged, 
such a termination would not violate 
any duty of good faith. 
m. Plaintiff Presented No Evidence Of 
Fraud Accompanying The Alleged 
Breach Of Contract Sufficient To Sus-
tain This Cause Of Action. 
12] The essential elements of Plain-
tiff's claim for breach of contract ac-
companied by fraudulent act are: (1) a 
breach of contract; (2) fraudulent in-
tent in connection with the breach of 
contract; and, (3) a fraudulent act ac-
companying the breach. Smith v. Ca~ 
nal Ins. Co., 275 S.C. 256, 269 S.E.2d 
348, 350 (1988); Floyd v. Country Squire 
Mobile Homes, Inc., 287 S.C. 51, 336 
S.E.2d 502, 503-04 (Ct.App 1985). As-
suming for the moment that Plaintiff 
can establish the first element set out 
above, there was a complete failure of 
proof as to the other two elements. 
Plaintiff made no showing of any 
fraudulent act by Defendant at the 
time of the termination. Plaintiff pre-
sented no evidence that he was dis-
charged for reasons other than the 
economic reason articulated by the 
Company. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence from which the jury could 
infer fraudulent intent on the part of 
Defendant. No knowing misrepresen-
tation was proved, as required to sus-
tain this cause of action. 
IV. The 1981 Dorchester Coca-Cola 
Handbook Does Not Constitute A Con-
tract Of Employment Between Plaintiff 
And Defendant. 
In Ludwick v. This Minute of Caroli-
na, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 U 
IER Cases 1099] (1985), the South 
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed 
that the "at-will" doctrine continues 
to govern employment relationships in 
South Carolina. Without equivoca-
tion, the Ludwick court stated, "The 
doctrine of termination at will re-
mains the law of this state." 337 S.E.2d 
at 216. The Court stated further, "Be-
yond (a concern for vexatious and 
frivolous litigationl is a common con-
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cern that the employer not be unduly 
fettered in exercising his rightful pre-
rogative to select employees." Id. Lud-
ivick thus affirms the continuation of 
the presumption of at-will employ-
ment in South Carolina. 
In Small v. Springs Industries, Inc. 
292 S.C. 481. 357 S.E.2d 452 [2 IER 
Cases 266] (1987), the South Carolina 
Supreme Court recognized, under a 
unilateral contract theory, that an 
employer's written policy may consti-
tute a contractual modification of the 
at-will relationship if the policy was "a 
limiting agreement on the employee's 
at-will employment status." 357 S.E.2d 
at 455. The holding in Small did not 
abrogate the Ludwick presumption. 
Employment is at will unless the em-
ployer's written policy contains limit-
ing language providing for a different 
employment relationship. 
(3) In Small the employee handbook 
outlined a four-step disciplinary pro-
cedure which altered the otherwise at-
will employment relationship. Simi-
larly, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross <fc Blue 
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 
1115 LRRM 4708) (1988), upon which 
Small is based, the employee handbook 
in question contained a specific state-
ment that discharge would be "for just 
cause only." Id. at 884. The 1981 Dor-
chester handbook does not contain the 
type of specific procedure or specific 
discharge policy addressed in these 
two cases. In fact, notliing in the Dor-
chester handbook sets forth how lay-
offs or terminations will take place. 
Without some limiting language in 
the handbook, Defendant's right to 
dismiss employees for any reason re-
mains unfettered. 
Our holding that this handbook is 
not sufficient to establish a contract 
finds support from cases in other ju-
risdictions. For example, in Mursch v. 
Van Dorn Co., 851 F.2d 990 [3 IER 
Cases 893] (7th Cir. 1988), the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals found as a 
matter of law that no claim for breach 
of contract existed where the hand-
book's repeated use of nonmandatory 
guidelines and permissive wording in-
dicated clear intent not to create a 
binding agreement. The handbook in 
question repeatedly referred to its pro-
visions as "guidelines," and failed to 
contain either "a hierarchy of rules 
the infraction of which could lead to 
discharge, . . . (and/or a provision] that 
a discharge would only be for 'just 
cause.'" Id. at 996 (citations omitted). 
The court held that an employment 
manual can alter an employee's at-will 
status only if the handbook contains 
express language "clearly manifest-
ling] the parties' intent to bind each 
other." Id. at 998. 
14] Plaintiff's contract claim was 
twofold. In addition to his claim that 
the Dorchester handbook constituted 
a contract, Plaintiff asserted that cer-
tain oral assurances by the prior own-
ers of Dorchester constituted terms of 
his employment contract with Sun-
belt. However, these oral assurances of 
the prior owners are irrelevant, inas-
much as they were never adopted by 
Sunbelt Coca-Cola. Furthermore, 
Plaintiff himself admitted that the 
1981 handbook constituted a complete 
compilation of all Dorchester employ-
ment policies in operation at the time. 
In addition, the oral assurances by 
Dorchester's prior and present owners 
allegedly relied upon by Plaintiff con-
sist only of general statements about 
Job security which are not sufficient to 
change the nature of the at-will em-
ployment relationship. Aberman v. 
Maiden Mills Indus., Inc., 414 N.W.2d 
769, 772 [2 IER Cases 1430] (Minn. 
Ct.App. 1987). In Aberman, the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals gave the follow-
ing examples of oral statements that, 
absent stipulation of the duration of 
the employment, do not create employ-
ment contracts: " 'permanent employ-
ment,' 'life employment/ . . . 'as long as 
the employee chooses' 'I will al-
ways take care of you,' *we are offering 
you security,* and lyou will be a] life-
time sales representative.' " Id. at 
771-72; Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper 
Co., 197 Minn. 291, 294-95, 266 N.W. 
872, 874 (1936). Likewise in Mursch, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the state-
ment by the company vice president 
that "so long as you do your job you 
can be here until you're a hundred" 
amounted merely to "encouragement 
and optimism" and as such did not 
create a contract of employment. 851 
F.2d at 996. The court noted further 
that no reasonable employee would 
have taken such a statement to be a 
binding contract of guaranteed em-
ployment and that such a statement 
"should not be twisted and contrived 
into an expression of intent to create a 
binding contract of lifetime employ-
ment." Id. at 998. Like the statements 
discussed in Aberman and Mursch, the 
oral statements relied upon by Plain-
tiff in the present case are the type of 
"oral, uncorroborated, vague in impor-
tant details and highly improbable" 
statements which are not sufficient to 
establish an employment contract. 
Aberman, 414 N.W.2d at 771 (quoting 
Degen v. Investors Diversified Servs., 
Inc., 260 Minn. 424, 428-29, 110 N.W.2d 
863, 866 (1961)). 
Even if the Dorchester handbook 
and oral assurances were to be viewed 
as contractual, Defendant negated 
any contractual effect by notifying 
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plaintiff that his employment was at 
nil. The Supreme Court of South 
Carolina in Small expressly empha-
sized that an employer retains the 
freedom to preserve the at-will rela-
tionship. The court stated: 
U an employer wishes to issue policies, 
manuals, or bulletins as purely advisory 
fut*ments with no intent of being bound 
fcv them and with a desire to continue un-
der the employment at will policy, he cer-
uirJv is free to do so. This could be accom-
phshed merely by inserting a conspicuous 
disclaimer or provision into the written doc-
ument. 
357 S.E.2d at 455. Thus where an em-
plover has affirmatively expressed its 
desire to preserve the at-will relation-
ship with its employees, an employ-
ment policy cannot provide the basis 
for a contrary contract claim, unilafc-
era) or otherwise. 
In the present case, Defendant Sun-
belt effectively preserved the at-will 
nature of Plaintiff's employment br-
acing exactly as the state Supreme 
Court recommended: it issued to 
Plaintiff two conspicuous disclaimers, 
one in 1985. shortly after Defendant 
bought the Company, and the second 
in 1988. prior to Plaintiff's termina-
tion. The fact that Plaintiff denied 
signing the first disclaimer is irrele-
vant; he admitted that he received and 
filled out the application containing 
the disclaimer. His failure to turn in 
the second disclaimer to Company of-
ficials is similarly irrelevant. He" ad-
muted that he received the disclaimer, 
read it, signed it, and understood what 
it meant. 
15) Plaintiff's express assent to this 
modification is not required. In the 
unilateral contract framework, which 
clearly applies to the alleged contract, 
the employees' returning to work the 
next day constitutes his acceptance of 
End consideration for the employer's 
modification of existing policies. 
Brookshaiv v. South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 
381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct.App. 1986). 
This holding finds support in a recent 
decision of the Michigan Supreme 
court, which decided Toussaint. In 
Bcnkey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., No. 
78200 [4 IER Cases 673] (Mich. June 6, 
1989) (LEXIS, States library, Mich. 
file), the court held that an employer 
may unilaterally change from a dis-
charge-for-cause to an employments 
at-will policy. Mutual assent to the 
modification is not required. The court 
reasoned that in cases such as Tous-
ic\rat "where 'contractual rights' have 
ansen outside the operation of normal 
contract principles, the application of 
strict rules of contractual modifica-
tion may not be appropriate." 
To hold Defendant liable for a 
breach of contract in the face of two 
conspicuous, unambiguous disclaim-
ers acknowledged by Plaintiff would 
be to ignore completely the South 
Carolina Supreme Court's admonition 
in Small Accordingly, this Court finds 
that no implied contract of employ-
ment existed between Plaintiff and 
Defendant. 
Finally, even if the Dorchester 
handbook did create an implied con-
tract, Defendant 6unbelt did not 
breach that contract in discharging 
Plaintiff. Rather, Defendant Sunbelt 
clearly discharged Plaintiff in accord-
ance with the plan and unambiguous 
terms of a specific provision included 
in the handbook. The Dorchester 
handbook provides in its list of general 
principles as follows: 
7. That the Company will try insofar as 
possible to provide permanent, steady work 
to all employees subject to its normal busi-
ness conditions. 
Defendant presented uncontested evi-
dence that business conditions were 
not "normal" at the time of Plaintiff's 
discharge. Plaintiff, himself, conceded 
that earlier layoffs and the closing of 
production at the facility did not con-
stitute "normal business conditions." 
16] Plaintiff argued that the hand-
book and oral assurances created an 
expectation that he could be dis-
charged only for just cause. However, 
it is widely held that an economically 
motivated reduction in force consti-
tutes "just cause for dismissal." See 
Boynton v. TRW, Inc., 858 F.2d 1178, 
1179-80 [3 IER Cases 13501 (6th Cir. 
1988) (applying Michigan law); Cray-
son v. American Airlines, Inc., 803 F.2d 
1097 [1 IER Cases 849] (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Oklahoma law); Gianaculas 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F.2d 
1391, 1395 11 IER Cases 938] (9th Cir. 
1985) (interpreting both New York and 
California law); Parker v. Diamond 
Crystal Salt Co., 683 F.Supp. 168, 173 13 
IER Cases 398] (W.D. Mich. 1988). 
Therefore, even if Plaintiff's discharge 
is controlled by a contractual "just 
cause" provision, Defendant did not 
breach this provision when it dis-
charged Plaintiff for economic rea-
sons. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the evidence is not sufficient 
to submit the case to the jury- No con-
troverted issue of material fact exists 
on which reasonable persons could dif-
fer. For the reasons set forth above, 
Defendant's Motion for Directed Ver-
dict is hereby granted. Judgment is 
hereby entered in Defendant's favor as 
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to all causes of action Each party is to 
bear its own costs 
IT IS SO ORDERED this the 12 day 
of August, 1989. 
MILLS v. LEATH 
U.S. District Court, 
District of South Carolina, 
Florence Division 
MILLS v LEATH, Individually and 
as City Manager for the City of Myrtle 
Beach, et al, No 4 88-2483-15, Novem-
ber 4, 1988 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
1. Due-process hearing —- Property 
interest — City police officer — Stat-
ute M25.0607 *505.11 
City police officer's due-process 
claim premised on 42 USC 1983 must 
fail where he uorked at-will, since he 
had no property interest in continued 
employment under South Carolina 
statute giving city manager authority 
to remove employees "when necessary 
for the good cause of the municipal-
ity " 
2. Due-process hearing — Property 
interest — City police officer — Per-
sonnel manual •425.0607 •450.1205 
City personnel manual providing 
that employment was at-will does not 
give rise to property interest in contin-
ued employment despite policy state-
ment that disciplinary actions would 
be fair and not based on discrimina-
tory considerations. 
3. Due-process hearing — Liberty 
interest «— City police officer — Rea-
sons for discharge •425.0606 
City police officer who was dis-
charged for "dereliction of duty," al-
legedly based on his outspoken dis-
agreement with department policy 
requiring that officers write at least 
two speeding citations per shift, failed 
to state liberty-interest claim under 42 
USC 1983, since he produced no evi-
dence that reasons for discharge were 
publicly disclosed 
4. Conspiracy to discharge — Prop-
erty interest — City police officer 
•425.0607 >200.01 
City police officer who alleged that 
he was discharged because he disa-
greed with department policy requir-
ing that officers write at least two 
speeding citations per shift failed to 
state claim that department office 
conspired to terminate his emp'oy. 
ment, at-will status precludes sui 
cause of action. 
JURISDICTION 
5. Pendent jurisdiction — Stai*.U» 
claims »5<X>.05 
Federal district court declines to ex-
ercise pendent jurisdiction over su> 
law claim for wTongful discha,ft 
where city has been granted summary judgment on police officer's remairur* 
federal due process claims 
See also 4 IER Cases 1462. 
John R Clark, Myrtle Beach, S C, 
for plaintiff 
Vance J Bettis, Columbia, S C for 
defendants 
Full Text of Opinion 
HAMILTON, District Judge - Th-s 
case arises out of plaintiff s termini-
tion from employment as a police offi-
cer on June 29, 1988 The matter a 
presently before the court on defen-
dants* motion to dismiss, Rule 12<b*6i. 
Fed R Civ. Proc , or in the alternant 
for summary judgment Rule 56 Fed 
R Civ Proc. The court has jurisdic-
tion pursuant to 28 U S C § 1331 
The court has concluded that defen-
dants' motion for summarv. jud&rre".: 
should be granted on t*o of the cLajni 
and the remaining pendent stale .AI 
claim dismissed without prejudice 
I. BACKGROUND: 
Plaintiff, James Mills, * as an er> 
ployee of the Myrtle Beach Police De-
partment from May 1971 until he *u 
terminated by police chief Staney 
Bird on June 29, 1988 ImmecUaj 
prior to his termination, plaintiff tr 
leges he was directed to issue two 
speeding tickets during each shift re-
gardless of his other duties or ghetto 
•Plaintiff initially filed suit In state cour » 
Aurust 31 1988 and defendants removed una* » 
U S C §1441 on September 23 1988 
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